Introduction
In the millennial issue of the Journal of Democracy, public intellectuals from around the globe addressed issues affecting the future of democracy through the texts of The notion of an inevitable movement from aristocracy to democracy was not unique to Tocqueville, but he was unusual in arguing that if social democratization was irreversible, its political significance had yet to be determined. A free way of life (citizens with a vital local civic culture who ruled themselves successfully through representative national institutions) and an unfree existence (passive individuals dominated by new forms of bureaucratic, caesaristic, or quasi-military rule) were both inherent possibilities of the modern age. To achieve the former and avoid the latter depended on decoding certain signs that revealed the ways in which the new social state constrained politics.
These indicators were not auspicious. In Tocqueville's account, several tendencies inherent to democracy combine to make self-government precarious. With the emergence of social equality comes a passion for equality: "ardent, insatiable, eternal, 
II. A similar point de départ
Let me turn now to the ways in which Tocqueville's discussion of the dilemmas of western democratization resonates in the East. Characterized by debates over both the role of political culture and the coercive capacity of strong deeply-rooted states, the literature on democracy in Asia presents immediate parallels with Tocqueville. Perhaps the deepest affinity is the common focus on understanding and reconstructing the political role of moeurs. Indeed, Tocqueville's understanding of moeurs has been compared directly to the Confucian view that the habits of daily life are engrained and unreflective dispositions that become a kind of second human nature.
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A sensitivity to how moeurs change, persist or resurface in new guises, and especially to how they relate to the changing role of the state in different societies, runs through the study of politics in East Asia. One might take one's initial bearing from antithesis between gentilhomme (nobleman) and roturier (plebeian) until the Revolution, when both words dropped out of common use altogether. 20 The lack of a French word to bridge social caste differences helps to explain the class animosities that later emerged in Lucien Pye is the most prominent example of the view that paternalistic conceptions of power in Asia-with the partial exception of Japan-are distinctive and deeply rooted in traditional ways of thought that predate the modern era. 23 Pye's book is more subtle and nuanced than this categorization suggests, but nevertheless it is fair to say that he holds that democratization is unlikely in anything like the western sense because the process depends on distinctive cultural and religious values absent in Asia.
The view is echoed in the work of David Steinberg, who traces Korean notions of the need for political purity-and the consequent belief in the pollution of ideological heterodoxy-to the grip of its Confucian traditions. "Conformity, the adherence to social norms of behavior, and its intellectual corollary orthodoxy, have been major social forces in Korean history, perhaps more so than in many other nations." 24 This view about the distinctive historicity of Asian moeurs is often, though not always, combined with arguments that these traditions are hostile to democracy, and it was famously exploited by authoritarian Asian leaders in the so-called Asian values debate of the 1990s. consciousness by the East European democratic transitions and now ubiquitous in the theoretical literature, the concept of civil society also pervades discussions of democratization in East Asia. 30 Like the concept itself, these discussions are both murky and difficult to parse. Here I merely wish to call attention to a persistent division in the way this term is employed in the Asian context. Some use it to refer to associational cultures (civil societies) favoring democratization that are alleged to exist or be emerging in East Asia. Others, however, claim either that it is a mistake to describe Asian societies as civil or a mistake to see them as pro-democratic.
Those who deploy the concept of civil society to link associational life in Asian countries to the emergence of political democracy come in various stripes. Some point to the ways in which economic modernization fosters forms of western-style organizations that demand (or will eventually demand) participation and civilian political activity. 31 One example of this type would be Han San-Jin's argument that a combination of socioeconomic modernization and university-centered popular movements in Korea have led to counter-publics, a "new backbone of civil society" that he calls the "middling grassroots." 32 Some find in Asian associational practices more indigenous forms of civil society. It has been explicitly argued for the case of Taiwan that strong group consciousness-even if these groups are hierarchical-can contribute to a democratic transition. 33 In Korea some scholars have argued that distinctive networks based on blood, school, or region are innovative webs of connection that may provide the kind of flexibility and support needed to sustain further economic and political development. 34 On the other side of the opinion divide about the role of civil society are those who argue that the Asian case demonstrates not the capacity of new or evolving associations to support independent political action, but rather the ease with which the state can manipulate such groups. As did Tocqueville in the Old Regime, these writers depict a political culture with a fatal attraction to centralized autocracy. Some of these studies of culture and democratic governance in Asia deny the usefulness of the term civil society altogether. 35 Others employ the term only to note that the character of civil society can make democratization less rather than more likely. The literature is replete with references to the unwillingness of the middles classes in East Asia to sacrifice for the public good and their readiness to be mobilized into new nationalist ideologies. 36 Frequently the term "Bonapartist" surfaces, referring to strong leaders who use a hollow traditionalist rhetoric to dominate materialistic apolitical urban elites. 37 Asia that both acknowledges and transcends its past.
In the words of French scholar Laurence Guellec, the aim of Democracy in America was to "[forge] a style capable of combining thought and action, of imparting knowledge while simultaneously shaping the world." 43 The same impulse to use scholarship to open up a particular universe of possibilities, and to inspire policy-makers to act on them, characterizes some contemporary theorists of Asian democracy. Indeed, these writers adopt strategies remarkably similar to those Tocqueville employed to destabilize conventional assumptions that he thought were paralyzing political life in
France. I want to consider three of those strategies here: finding human exemplars that contradict settled beliefs, narrating "just so" counter histories that bolster the political will, and reducing anxiety about change by valorizing the role of the family.
Living contradictions
In Democracy in America Tocqueville told a somewhat improbable story about the increasing role of Catholicism in democratic America in order to encourage his readers to consider a different role for religion in politics. French republicans were hostile to religion as a whole, Tocqueville thought, because they misread Catholicism's historical association with aristocracy and absolutism as necessary rather than contingent.
The right, on the other hand, opposed democratization partly because they thought it entailed secularization. Again they mistook accident for necessity. An obvious move, then, was to find sincere Catholics who were also democrats. Hence the authentically Confucianism "is capable of embracing the idea of democracy and that it can be developed for this purpose." 45 These scholars assume that the historical fusion of its values of universal equality and personal accountability.
French and Korean Just So Stories
Another way to persuade one's audience that political democracy of a certain kind is feasible is to discover a viable historical prototype, as Tocqueville did in his appendix to the Old Regime on the province of Languedoc. Languedoc had the same history as the rest of France save that it had retained the traditional local assembly of Estates, which had a measure of taxing power and control over public works. These Estates, Tocqueville argued, provided a mediating space in which nobles, bourgeois, clergy and monarchs could cooperate for the public good, and they did so. Languedoc reveals what the French provinces "could all easily have become." 47 The lesson of Languedoc was not so much that older patterns of deference, or even old institutions, could have survived, but rather that a new democratic spiritmanifest in the economic development of the province and in the political dominance of the bourgeois majority-appropriated and worked its will by creatively transforming existing institutions. This new power was both restrained by other groups and able to work in creative partnership with a strong centralizing state. Whatever the truth of Tocqueville's account, it was this path on which he hoped to push his contemporaries.
The example of Languedoc was a road-not-followed elsewhere in France only because of the lack of "perseverance and effort" on the part of political elites. 48 register. 57 Chaibong uses Tocqueville to explore the question of whether the social and existential problems of individualism that Tocqueville outlined are the inevitable price that must be paid for democracy, or whether they may yet be avoided. Like others he also follows Tocqueville in his hope that "family values" may play a major part in such avoidance.
Tocqueville kept his own fears about the isolating effects of democracy in check-and assured his audience that democratic challenges were not too great for them to master-in part by romanticizing the role of women and the family. In democracies, he argued, the family both anchored and disciplined male citizens and offered them a respite States as yet another case (like the tendency to form associations and to cleave to religion) in which Americans exploited the tendencies of democracy itself, he fails to explain how and why women escape the psychological transformations wrought by equality, with its affinities for self-assertion and its resentment of perceived inequalities.
And the subsequent revolution in the lives of women, in their roles as citizens, and in conceptions of how gender intersects with the polity have in fact belied his account that stable political democracy demands the sequestering of women.
In contemporary East Asia, there is a similar yearning to recast the traditional family as a bulwark against the materialism of the market and the encroachments of the state. 59 It is true that in Asia the family has a different relation to conceptions of public and private than in the West. Never consigned to the private or natural realm, the traditional family has long been the locus of moral socialization for both men and women. In his study of neo-Confucian attempts to reconstruct a ritualized family sphere as a counterweight to empire, Chaibong offers one of the most sophisticated discussions of the differences between how Western and Eastern understandings of the family have been embedded in the larger social and political universe. 60 But his aim is to validate the project of these neo-Confucian intellectuals, who deliberately sought to construct an intermediary body between individual and state that allegedly created what some hope to achieve in civil society, that is, a moral space with a telos of its own. There is no reason why the institution of the family, Chaibong argues, cannot be "rethought, rearticulated so that it can be privileged above and beyond society or perhaps even the state." Yet this view of the Asian family as a mediating institution, like Tocqueville's characterization of ordered family life as the necessary substratum of a well-functioning democratic polity, equally depends on constraining women's lives and choices. Chaibong himself recognizes that "there is no easy way out of the dilemma" posed by the reality that the Confucian family ethic is "hierarchical, authoritarian, and gender biased." 61 Although some have advocated pushing Asian political practice toward a "careoriented" Confucianism that elevates the mother's role within traditional familism, it is unclear how far women themselves have endorsed such an aim. 62 In an essay specifically focused on the resources of Confucianism for Asian feminism, Chan Yin See concludes that the project has definite limits. 63 It is perhaps evidence of the difficulty of retraditionalizing the role of the family in a way that maintains democracy as a universal aspiration that few Asian feminists have framed their demands for justice and equality in traditional language; rather they adopt a version of what is sometimes called the normative language of globalization, that is, the language of human rights and democracy. 64 I have suggested that Tocqueville and East Asian scholars promoting their "own" version of democracy recast and reclaim historical practices in order to contest conventional views and to jolt their readers into imagining new political arrangements.
Enlisting the family to repress anxieties about rapid and disorienting change, however, more often appears to bow to convention and to shutter the imagination. If I end on a cautionary note, it is still a Tocquevillean one. Tocqueville himself notes that the thing we should most dread in democratic times is the loss of free thought and free will; we need to embrace the "trouble of thinking and the difficulty of living."
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To deliberate democratization with Tocqueville is precisely to welcome this double embrace. 
